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Abstract
As applied to software-related inventions, one of the most difficult and persistent issues in patent
law is the appropriate scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which defines patentable subject matter.
Specifically, the law remains unsettled as to whether claims to computer-readable media
containing software (often called “Beauregard-type” or “floppy disk” claims) and claims to data
signals embodied on carrier waves fall within the scope of § 101 as a general matter. Achieving
final resolution of this question has important implications not only for patent law but for a wide
swath of the information technology industry, as electronic distribution becomes an increasingly
attractive means for dissemination of software. This paper explores the patentability of these
Beauregard-type stored software claims under §§ 101 – 103 of the Patent Act through
examination of several key Federal Circuit cases and policies of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. Ultimately, after discussion of the merits of various alternative distinctions
between patentable and non-patentable subject matter, this paper concludes that exclusion of
both Beauregard-type stored software claims and data signal claims from the sweep of § 101
presents the most consistent and workable solution through the implementation of a direct
functional relationship requirement for claims to software encoded on computer-readable storage
or transmission media.
I. Introduction
Although use of computers and computer software have become both indispensable and
routine, the legal framework providing and protecting intellectual property rights in software
remains somewhat uncertain in many respects. In part, this uncertainty can be explained by the
mismatch between the rapid pace of technological progress and the much slower evolution of the
law. More fundamentally, software eludes categorization in any satisfying manner with respect
to the general divisions between the different realms of intellectual property; software is both
functional and expressive, making it difficult to determine what protection, if any, software
should enjoy under patent and/or copyright law.
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Within patent law, one of the most difficult and persistent issues is the appropriate scope
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 1 which defines patentable subject matter, with respect to software-related
inventions. Although as a general matter, software as part of a computer can be the subject of a
patent, 2 claims to mathematical algorithms (like software) per se are considered to fall outside
the scope of § 101. 3 Without some stated relationship to something tangible, such as a computer
on which the software can be run, software is merely an abstract idea, not useful itself, and thus
not patentable. 4 These principles are relatively clear from the teachings of the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However,
ambiguities remain as to the type and extent of the functional relationship needed between
software and a tangible object for the claimed invention to qualify as patentable subject matter
under § 101, as novel under § 102, 5 and as nonobvious under § 103. 6

Specifically, the law

remains unsettled as to whether claims to computer-readable media containing software (often
called “Beauregard 7 -type” or “floppy disk” claims) 8 and claims to data signals embodied on
carrier waves fall within the scope of § 101 as a general matter.
This paper explores these ambiguities through examination of several key Federal Circuit
cases (Part II) and guidance from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (Part
III).

Part IV discusses the merits of alternative distinctions between patentable and non-

1

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
3
See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
4
See id. at 1373. (“Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas
constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not ‘useful.’”).
5
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
6
35 U.S.C.S. § 103 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006).
7
See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
8
Since “Beauregard-type claim” is not directly descriptive of the subject matter of a claim, and “floppy disk claim”
is somewhat incomplete and limited, as the subject matter comprises both software and a computer-readable
medium (not limited to a floppy disk), this article will refer to such claims as “Beauregard-type stored software
claims.”
2
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patentable subject matter. Part V argues that exclusion of both Beauregard-type stored software
claims and data signal claims from the sweep of § 101 presents the most consistent and workable
solution through the implementation of a direct functional relationship requirement for claims to
software encoded on computer-readable storage or transmission media.
II. The Evolving Approach To Patentability of Software-Related Inventions at the Federal
Circuit
In 1994, the Federal Circuit issued opinions in In re Alappat 9 and In re Lowry. 10 Each
case answered key questions about the patentability of software-related inventions while leaving
ample uncertainty regarding the ultimate boundaries of § 101 as applied to software. 35 U.S.C. §
101 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 11
Although a § 101 rejection was before the court only in Alappat and not in Lowry, in both
cases the court examined whether certain judicially-articulated exceptions to patentability
relevant to the § 101 inquiry (abstract ideas, printed matter) were applicable. The third case
discussed below, In re Beauregard, 12 initially presented patentability questions slightly different
from those posed in Lowry. However, the Federal Circuit did not have a chance to determine
whether Beauregard’s claims fell within § 101 as the USPTO dropped its printed matter rejection
and asked the court to dismiss the case. 13

9

33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
11
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
12
53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
13
Id. at 1584.
10
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A. In re Alappat: Software + General Purpose Computer = Patentable
The Federal Circuit’s en banc majority opinion in In re Alappat 14 laid important
groundwork for the expansion of software patentability. The invention in Alappat generally
related to a means for improving the appearance of waveforms displayed on the screen of digital
oscilloscopes. 15 More specifically, the invention used mathematical algorithms to modulate the
intensity of illumination of digital display screen pixels, based on the distance between the center
of each pixel and the trajectory of the waveform to give the displayed waveforms a smooth,
continuous appearance. 16 Claim 15, the only independent claim at issue on appeal, provided:
A rasterizer for converting vector list data representing sample magnitudes of an input
waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the endpoints of each of the
vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined function of the
normalized vertical distance and elevation. 17
Claim 15 as well as dependent claims 16-19 18 were rejected during prosecution by the
patent examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. 19
In evaluating the § 101 eligibility of claims 15-19, the Federal Circuit used a two-step
process: first, whether the claim at issue fell preliminarily within one of the § 101 categories; and
second, whether an exception to § 101 applied. With respect to the first step, the court noted that

14

33 F.3d 1526.
Id. at 1537.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1538-39.
18
Claims 16-19 each depended directly from claim 15. Each of these dependent claims further limited claim 15 by
specifying a particular structure for carrying out one of the “means” limitations of claim 15. See id. at 1541.
19
Id. at 1531. Although initially reversed by a three-member panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(Board), an expanded panel of the Board reinstated the § 101 rejection. The expanded Board panel concluded that
claim 15 was directed to “the mathematical algorithm itself, rather than an application of the mathematical algorithm
to an otherwise statutory process or apparatus.” Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1340, 1347 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
15
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the rasterizer of claim 15 was a specific type of machine, thus falling within one of the categories
of patentable inventions enumerated in § 101. 20

The court followed this facial and rather

perfunctory analysis with a more thorough exploration of the judicially-articulated exceptions to
§ 101, namely “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,” the three categories
discussed by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr. 21 The Federal Circuit lamented the lack
of any consistent explanation from the Supreme Court regarding the patent eligibility of certain
types of mathematical subject matter, and how (or if) mathematical subject matter fit within any
of the three Diehr categories. 22 The Federal Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s various
decisions regarding mathematical subject matter 23 suggested that rather than creating a fourth
exception to § 101, these cases explained that “certain types of mathematical subject matter,
standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical
application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.” 24
Working within this rubric, as well as under the Supreme Court’s directive in Diehr to
focus on the claim as a whole, rather than only on its constituent parts, in the court evaluated the
applicability of § 101 or its exceptions. 25 The Federal Circuit concluded that even though many
(or possibly all) of the means limitations of claim 15 represented circuitry elements that
performed mathematical calculations, “the claimed invention as a whole is directed to a
combination of interrelated elements which combine to form a machine . . . [t]his is not a

20

Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541-42.
Id. at 1542-43 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
22
Id. at 1543 n19.
23
Id. at 1543 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)).
24
Id. at 1543.
25
Id. at 1543 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192).
21
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disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” 26
Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that claim 15 was unpatentable merely because
it read on a general purpose computer programmed to carry out the patented invention, as
programming in effect makes a special purpose computer out of a general purpose computer. 27
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that a computer is an apparatus rather than simply
mathematics, and that “a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable
subject matter.” 28
B. In re Lowry: Memory Management Software + Memory = Patentable
Decided less than two months after Alappat, In re Lowry 29 provided further detail
regarding the patentability of computer-related inventions. Lowry’s invention “provide[d] an
efficient, flexible method of organizing stored data in a computer memory” by optimizing both
the functional and structural expressiveness of data models. 30 During prosecution, the examiner
rejected claims 1-5 of Lowry’s application under § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject
matter. 31 Claim 1 recited “a memory for storing data for access by an application program,
comprising: a data structure stored in said memory . . .” and several additional limitations. 32 The
examiner also rejected claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the prior art, and
claims 20-29 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by the prior art. 33

26

Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1545.
28
Id.
29
32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
30
Id. at 1580.
31
See id..
32
Id. at 1581.
33
Id. at 1580.
27
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The Board likewise rejected all of Lowry’s claims, though it affirmed only the § 102(e)
and § 103 rejections while reversing the § 101 rejection. 34

As such, Lowry’s appeal of the

Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit was limited to the § 102(e) and § 103 rejections. Except
to note that the Board concluded that claims 1-5, as a whole, were “directed to a memory
containing stored information,” “recited an article of manufacture,” and as such were directed
toward statutorily patentable subject matter, the Federal Circuit did not address the § 101 issue
specifically. 35
The Board based its affirmation of the §102(e) and § 103 rejections on a comparison of
Lowry’s claimed data structures to printed matter. 36 As explained by the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure, “a mere arrangement of printed matter, though seemingly a
‘manufacture,’ is rejected as not being within the statutory classes.” 37 As for the relevance of
printed matter to § 102 and § 103, the “critical question” according to the Federal Circuit in both
Lowry and In re Bernhart “is whether there exists any new and unobvious functional relationship
between the printed matter and the substrate.” 38
Applying these principles to Lowry’s claimed invention, the court distinguished Lowry’s
data structures from printed matter in several respects. First, the court stated that the printed
matter cases, which focused on claims directed to “certain novel arrangements of printed lines or
characters, useful and intelligible only to the human mind,” were not factually relevant for
inventions with claims requiring a machine to process the information. 39 Second, unlike printed
matter, Lowry’s data structures did not simply represent underlying information; instead the data
34

Id.
Id. at 1582.
36
Id.
37
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (8th ed. Oct.
2005) (internal citations omitted).
38
Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582 (quoting In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
39
Id. at 1583 (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
35
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structures “dictate[d] how application programs manage information.” 40

Therefore, the data

structures had a functional relationship to the claimed memory. Third, rather than claiming the
information content of the memory itself as an abstract idea, Lowry’s claims “require[d] specific
electronical structural elements which impart a physical organization on the information stored in
memory.” 41 The court recognized that Lowry’s stored data did not adopt a physical structure per
se, but rather constituted “the essence of electronic structure.” 42 Again referencing Bernhart, the
court reiterated the following key point: “if a machine is programmed in a certain new and
unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine without that program; its memory
elements are differently arranged. The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye
should not tempt us to conclude that the machine has not been changed.” 43 Finally, the court
pointed out that even if Lowry’s data structures were analogous to printed matter, a printed
matter rejection was still inappropriate because the USPTO had not established a prima facie
case of unpatentability showing that the data structures lacked a new and nonobvious functional
relationship to the memory. 44 If the so-called “printed matter” performs a function, such a
rejection would be improper. 45
Although only the § 102(e) and § 103 rejections were on appeal to the Federal Circuit in
Lowry, as discussed supra, the court’s analysis of the inequivalence of printed matter and
computer software is nonetheless relevant to the questions posed by software-related claims
under § 101. For the most part, the court’s analysis regarding applicability of the printed matter
doctrine was generalized; rather than focusing specifically on the printed matter doctrine as

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. (quoting Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1400).
44
In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
45
Id. (citing In re Gulack, 703 F.3d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
41
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applied to novelty (§ 102) or nonobviousness (§ 103), the court discussed the overall relevance
of the printed matter doctrine to the patentability of Lowry’s data structures. However, looking
at Lowry in isolation, extension of the principles articulated therein is arguably somewhat
difficult given the particular nature of the software aspects of Lowry’s invention. Lowry’s data
structures and their attendant unique features functioned to manage and improve the efficiency of
the memory on which it was stored, unlike general software programs which merely use memory
as a storage medium and a platform from which to run. Thus, Lowry’s data structures were
functional, as related to the memory, in a way in which most software may not be. On the other
hand, the court’s analysis is structured so that it seems that the question of functionality of the
printed matter in relationship to the substrate is only asked in the context of the printed matter
rejection; if no printed matter rejection is warranted (e.g. based on the need for machinereadability in Lowry), then arguably functionality in relation to the substrate is irrelevant since
the element of the claimed invention at issue is not printed matter. The other two reasons for
inapplicability of a printed matter rejection articulated by the court in Lowry, that the software
could only be read by a machine and that a computer becomes a different machine upon
programming, seem germane to machine claims rather than article of manufacture claims.
However, this distinction is of limited relevance, as the court noted in a later case that the scope
of § 101 does not change with the form of the claim: “[w]hether stated implicitly or explicitly,
we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same regardless of the form- machine or process- in
which a particular claim is drafted.” 46 Once it can be determined that a claim is directed to at
least one of the four § 101 categories of statutory subject matter, the key inquiry focuses not on

46

AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1581) (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rader, J., concurring)).
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categorizing the claim within one of the four categories but rather on the “essential
characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” 47
C. In re Beauregard: Software + Memory = Patentable (By Default, At Least)
Like the claims in Lowry discussed in Part II.B., the claims at issue in In re Beauregard
were also directed toward a computer program embedded on a computer-readable medium. 48
However, in Beauregard, some of the claims were explicitly drafted as article of manufacture
claims. 49 During prosecution, Beauregard’s claims were rejected under § 101 as directed toward
non-statutory subject matter and under § 103 as obvious over “ ‘well-known data processing
techniques of storing ‘program code means’ on storage media for later use by a computer.’ ” 50
The Board affirmed the examiner’s § 101 and § 103 rejections, concluding that the computer
program, which operated to instruct a computer system to fill a polygon on a graphics display,
was merely printed matter with no functional relationship to its substrate (the computer-readable
medium). 51 In denying Beauregard’s request for reconsideration, the Board concluded: “[i]n the
final analysis, appellants’ invention differs from other substrates only by the informational
content of the series of computer instructions embodied or printed thereon. As such, the printed
matter exception to statutory subject matter under § 101 applies in the present case.”52
Although Beauregard appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit, the court did
not have the opportunity to review the appeal on its merits. The Commissioner of the United

47

Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
49
Ex parte Beauregard, Appeal No. 93-0378 (B.P.A.I. July 29, 1993). Beauregard’s patent eventually issued as U.S.
Pat. No. 5,710,578 (filed May 9, 1990).
50
Ex parte Beauregard, Appeal No. 93-0378 (B.P.A.I. July 29, 1993), (quoting Examiner’s statements during
prosecution.) Beauregard’s claims were also rejected under § 112, first paragraph, as insufficiently enabled by the
specification, § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite, and for obviousness-type double patenting over a related patent
directed to method and apparatus claims, though these rejections were reversed by the Board.
51
Ex parte Beauregard, Appeal No. 93-0378, 1993 Pat. App. LEXIS 40, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 29, 1993).
52
Ex parte Beauregard, Appeal No. 93-0378, 1994 Pat. App. LEXIS 9, at *5-6 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 1994) (request for
reconsideration).
48
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States Patent and Trademark Office moved to dismiss the appeal: “ ‘computer programs
embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. § § 102 and 103.’ ” 53 The Commissioner
also agreed with Beauregard that the printed matter doctrine was inapplicable.54 Since no case or
controversy remained, the court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 55 Therefore, whether Beauregard-type stored software claims, sometimes referred
to as “floppy disk” claims, 56 are permissible under § 101 remains ambiguous.
III. Evolution of the USPTO’s Approach to Patentability of Beauregard-type Stored
Software Claims and Data Signal Claims
In the dozen or so years since the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Alappat and Lowry, the
USPTO has provided a fair amount of guidance to examiners on how to approach the
patentability of software-related inventions. In its 1996 “Examination Guidelines for ComputerRelated Inventions” (1996 Guidelines),

57

the USPTO addressed software patentability

systemically, exploring issues ranging from claims to software per se to Beauregard-type stored
software claims.

Later that year, the USPTO issued its “Computer-Related Invention

Guidelines” (1996 Training Materials), which indicated that claims to computer data signals
embodied on carrier waves would be patentable subject matter under § 101. 58 Almost a decade

53

In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Richard H. Stern, An Attempt to Rationalize Floppy Disk Claims, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 183, 183 (1998).
57
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Guidelines].
58
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Computer-Related Invention Guidelines,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oppd/patoc.htm (1996) (no longer available), archived at
http://web.archive.org/web/19980529122936/http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oppd/patoc.htm (last
visited May 23, 2006) [hereinafter 1996 Training Materials].
54
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later, the USPTO changed course in its 2005 Interim Guidelines, suggesting that such data signal
claims fall outside the scope of § 101. 59
A. USPTO 1996 Guidelines: Reaffirming Beauregard
To understand the USPTO’s approach to interpreting Beauregard-type stored software
claims, it is helpful to first examine the approach taken in the 1996 Guidelines with respect to the
patentability of software claimed merely as such, without corresponding elements providing
some connection to a computer or a computer-readable medium.

Specifically, the 1996

Guidelines addressed the rationale for excluding claims to software alone from the realm of
statutory subject matter as follows:
[C]omputer programs claimed as computer listings per se, i.e., the descriptions or
expressions of the programs, are not physical “things,” nor are they statutory processes,
as they are not “acts” being performed. Such claimed computer programs do not define
any structural and functional interrelationships between the computer program and other
claimed aspects of the invention which permit the computer program's functionality to be
realized. 60
The USPTO’s emphasis on physical “things” was drawn from a prior characterization of
the § 101 machine, manufacture, and composition of matter categories as “things,” in contrast to
the “action” performed by a process, the fourth § 101 category. 61
As for the interpretation of claims involving computer software but not directed to
software per se, the USPTO began by providing a multi-tiered framework consistent with its
ultimate position in Beauregard. First, the USPTO divided “descriptive material,” (an umbrella
term comprising natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and laws of nature) into two categories:

59

United States Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Subject
Matter Eligibility, 1300 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 142 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines101_20051026.pdf [hereinafter 2005
Interim Guidelines].
60
1996 Guidelines, supra note 57, at 7481-82.
61
Id. at 7481.
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functional and non-functional. 62 Under the 1996 Guidelines, both functional descriptive material
(e.g. computer programs, data structures) and non-functional descriptive material (e.g. music,
literary works) are non-statutory when claimed per se. However, “when functional descriptive
material is recorded on some computer-readable medium it becomes structurally and functionally
interrelated to the medium and will be statutory in most cases.” 63 In contrast, when “nonfunctional descriptive material is recorded on some computer-readable medium, it is not
structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium but is merely carried by the medium.
Merely claiming non-functional descriptive material stored in a computer-readable medium does
not make it statutory.” 64 Functionality, in turn, can be “as part of the stored data or as part of the
computing processes performed by the computer.” 65 The data structures affecting the efficient
organization of computer memory in Lowry would therefore fall into the first category
(functionality as part of the stored data), whereas the polygon-filling software of Beauregard
would fall into the second (functionality as part of the processes performed by a computer).
Notably, the 1996 Guidelines did not rely explicitly on the printed matter doctrine to
distinguish between statutory and non-statutory subject matter.

Instead, the concept of

functionality, expressed in the printed matter doctrine as an exception to the non-statutory nature
of such inventions in which a functional relationship existed between the printed matter and the
substrate, was recrystallized in the 1996 Guidelines as the key attribute dividing potentially
statutory descriptive material (if claimed as part of a storage medium or a computer) from nonstatutory non-descriptive material.

62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 7482.
63
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The recasting of the functionality distinction in the 1996 Guidelines with regard to
descriptive materials rather than printed materials clarified the focus of the § 101 subject matter
inquiry for software-related inventions, as can be demonstrated through revisiting the claimed
data structures of In re Lowry, discussed in Part II.B. In Lowry, the importance of the functional
relationship between the data structures and the computer memory on which they were stored
was somewhat unclear. The court addressed the functional relationship issue in the context of the
printed matter doctrine, in essence as an exception or defense, whereby printed material could be
combined with some substrate to qualify as statutory subject matter if the printed material had a
functional relationship to the substrate. Since the court found that Lowry’s data structures were
not printed material because they could be processed only by a machine and not by the human
mind like traditional printed matter, 66 one might conclude that little guidance is provided as to
the importance of functionality outside the context of the printed matter doctrine. However, the
court went on to state that Lowry’s data structures were not analogous to printed matter due to
the functional relationship between the software and the substrate: rather than representing
“merely underlying data in a database,” the data structures in the claims at issue “define[d]
functional characteristics of the memory.” 67
The importance of the functional relationship of a claimed element to its substrate in
determining whether the claimed element is analogous to printed matter articulated by the
Federal Circuit in Lowry seems consistent with the functional/non-functional descriptive material
rubric articulated by the USPTO in the 1996 Guidelines. In both cases, determining whether a
functional relationship exists between some claim element that might be analogous to printed

66
67

In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id.
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matter (as in Lowry) or the descriptive material (under the 1996 Guidelines), and its substrate (as
in Lowry) or computer-readable medium (under the 1996 Guidelines), is the central question.
B. USPTO 1996 Training Materials: Beyond Beauregard, Endorsing Data Signal Claims
Not long after issuing the 1996 Guidelines, the USPTO provided Training Materials to
address certain aspects of the patentability and examination of computer-related inventions in
greater detail. Among the examples given in the 1996 Training Materials was the following
sample Claim 13:
A computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave comprising:
a. a compression source code segment comprising [recites self-documenting
source code]; and
b. an encryption source code segment comprising [recites self-documenting
source code]. 68
According to the 1996 Training Materials, the carrier wave of claim 13 is a computerreadable medium. 69 As such, and because claim 13 recites a specific article of manufacture, the
1996 Training Materials concluded that claim 13 is directed to statutory subject matter, 70
assuming that the claimed data signal does not occur as a natural phenomenon. 71 Also in 1996,
an article co-authored by the Solicitor of the USPTO and an Associate Solicitor noted that “[i]n
the future, the PTO is expected to interpret ‘computer-readable medium’ broadly, perhaps to
include a carrier wave for a data signal.” 72 This article provided the identical exemplary claim as
the 1996 Training Materials to a computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave, as shown
above, and stated that “[p]resuming that the signal is manufactured, as opposed to naturally

68

1996 Training Materials, supra note 58, at Claim Examples- Compression/Encryption Examples, Claims 37
(bracketed text in original).
69
Id. at Claim Examples- Compression/Encryption Examples, Claim Analysis 4.
70
Id.
71
Id. at Claim Examples- Compression/Encryption Examples, Claims 39. The examiner has the burden to prove
that the data signal is a natural phenomenon.
72
Nancy J. Linck & Karen A. Buchanan, Patent Protection for Computer-Related Inventions, 18 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L. J. 659, 677 (1996).

15

3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH 30 (2006)
http://www.okjolt.org/
occurring, there appears to be little basis for rejecting such a claim— it is specific software
embodied in a computer-readable medium. It also has a practical application in the technological
arts…” 73
C. USPTO 2005 Interim Guidelines: A Reversal on Data Signal Claims
In stark contrast to its endorsement of exemplary data signal claims as described in the
1996 Training Materials, the USPTO’s Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications for Subject Matter Eligibility, published in 2005, suggested that such claims
“appear[]” to fall outside the ambit of § 101 because they do not fit any of the § 101 categories. 74
Quickly dispensing with the possibility that a data signal claim could be a process (such a claim
does not recite a series of steps), the 2005 Interim Guidelines relied on the “traditional”
requirement of “physical structure or material” for claims directed toward products (machines,
compositions of matter, and manufactures). 75
With respect to articles of manufacture, the § 101 categorization attributed to signal
claims in the 1996 Guidelines, the 2005 Interim Guidelines provided a number of definitions of
“manufacture” used by courts over time as a basis for exploring the meaning of the term with
respect to signal claims. Most notably, the Interim Guidelines quoted a dictionary definition of
“manufacture” utilized by the Supreme Court in both American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex
Co. and Diamond v. Chakrabarty: “the production of articles for use from raw or prepared
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether
by hand-labor or by machinery.” 76 The Interim Guidelines interpreted this and other definitions
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2005 Interim Guidelines, supra note 59.
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Id.(emphasis added).
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Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
74

16

3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH 30 (2006)
http://www.okjolt.org/
of “manufacture” to require physicality.77 Since a data signal is comprised of energy and not
physical matter, the 2005 Interim Guidelines concluded that a data signal claim is therefore not
an article of manufacture or other product, and thus not within the scope of § 101. 78
Nonetheless, the Interim Guidelines went further, noting the similarity between data
signal claims and Beauregard-type stored software claims:
from a technological standpoint, a signal encoded with functional descriptive material is
similar to a computer-readable memory encoded with functional descriptive material, in
that they both create a functional interrelationship with a computer. In other words, a
computer is able to execute the encoded functions, regardless of whether the format is a
disk or a signal. 79
Presumptively in recognition of the tension between the different outcomes in terms of §
101 between software encoded on a computer-readable memory (statutory) and software
encoded on a carrier wave (non-statutory), the 2005 Interim Guidelines asked for public
comment to assist with further evaluation of the matter,80 with comments to be submitted by June
30, 2006. 81
IV. Where to Draw the Patentable Subject Matter Line?
The USPTO’s abrupt change of heart regarding the patentability of data signal claims
clearly invites the question of whether such signal claims are or should be within the scope of §
101. In asking this seemingly narrow question, however, one risks stepping across an event
horizon and becoming trapped in the black hole of reevaluating the patentability of softwarerelated claims more generally. If data signal claims are outside the scope of § 101, what about
Beauregard-type stored software claims? If Beauregard-type stored software claims fall outside
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§ 101, why not the data structure claims in Lowry? On the other hand, if data signal claims are
within § 101, just how ephemeral can the “manufacture” be? Why shouldn’t claims to software
per se be patentable?
To make this inquiry more manageable, it is helpful to limit the search for an appropriate
distinction between statutory and non-statutory subject matter to solutions that are reasonably in
keeping with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, as well as with the
language of § 101. As such, it is relatively simple to dismiss two of the aforementioned options.
First, to suggest that banishing signal claims from the realm of § 101 would also require
dispensing with claims of the type in Beauregard and particularly Lowry would obviously
conflict with the Federal Circuit’s decision on the merits in Lowry. Second, claims to software
per se, untethered to any means of storing, transmitting, or using the software, are also
problematic; without a computer (or arguably a storage medium), software remains merely a set
of abstract ideas, not reduced to any practical application. In the words of the Federal Circuit,
there must be “an examination of the contested claims to see if the claimed subject matter as a
whole is a disembodied mathematical concept… or if the mathematical concept has been reduced
to some practical application rendering it ‘useful.’” 82

In addition to the utility/practical

application issue, inclusion of per se software claims would seem to stretch four categories of
patentable subject material enumerated in § 101 a bit too much.
After eliminating these two extreme options, three more realistic options (absent
legislative change) remain. Option 1: inclusion of both Beauregard-type stored software claims
and data signal claims in § 101 (as per the 1996 Training Materials); Option 2: inclusion of
Beauregard-type stored software claims, but not data signal claims (as per the 2005 Interim

82
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Guidelines); and Option 3: exclusion of both Beauregard-type stored software claims and data
signal claims. Each of these Options will be discussed in turn.
A. Evaluating Option 1: § 101 encompasses both Beauregard-type stored software claims
and data signal claims.
At first glance, the inclusion of both types of claims in the § 101 family seems like an
attractive option. First, allowing for the patentability of both Beauregard-type stored software
claims and data signal claims would avoid the unsettling, form-over-function distinction
discussed by the USPTO in the 2005 Interim Guidelines 83 and restated in Part III.C. As noted by
the USPTO, the similarity from a “technological standpoint” 84 between Beauregard-type stored
software claims and data signal claims is undeniable; both function to deliver a computer
program to a computer. Second, inclusion of both types of claims would seem to comport nicely
with the expansive “anything under the sun that is made by man” approach to patentable subject
matter. 85
On the other hand, if data signal claims, given their lack of physicality, are patentable,
arguably there is little difference between a data signal claim and a claim to software per se.
Including both Beauregard-type stored software claims and data signal claims within the realm
of § 101 fails to provide a meaningful outer boundary on patent eligible subject matter. Whether
such a boundary exists at data signals or beyond, to some future claim involving some
technology even more removed from the functionality of the computer than a memory storage
device or a carrier wave, yet not so far as to software claims per se, would be unclear under this
approach.

83

2005 Interim Guidelines, supra note 59.
Id.
85
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
84

19

3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH 30 (2006)
http://www.okjolt.org/
B. Evaluating Option 2: § 101 encompasses Beauregard-type stored software claims but not
data signal claims.
As discussed supra with regard to Option 1, drawing the § 101 line between Beauregardtype stored software claims and data signal claims would emphasize formality over the similarity
of the storage/transmission technologies employed in the two claim types, since both
technologies provide a means for software developers and sellers to distribute their software to
customers (through sale of a disk or through transmission over the Internet). This formality is
dissatisfying for a number of reasons. First, legal distinctions drawn between fact patterns that
do not comport with meaningful technical distinctions are a poor foundation for the development
of subsequent jurisprudence, ultimately risking the development of a body of law that is out of
touch with reality.

Second, such a distinction could distort incentives for innovation by

protecting one form of software distribution (disks) but not another (downloads).
Moreover, the reasons articulated by the USPTO in the 2005 Interim Guidelines rely on
fuzzy “traditional” notions that manufactures under § 101 require physicality, 86 rather than on
arguments grounded in logic or clear direction from the courts. The USPTO’s reliance on
tradition in this case seems misplaced, given that none of the definitions necessarily excluded
non-physical inventions.

Additionally, the primary definition discussed by the USPTO was

cited by the Supreme Court in 1931 in American Fruit Growers, 87 long before the advent of
modern software-related inventions, so the Court’s failure to note the possibility of non-physical
“manufactures” does not seem particularly meaningful. Even the Court’s reuse of this definition
in 1980 in Chakrabarty 88 is not dispositive with regard to a physicality requirement, given that
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the facts of that case involved decidedly physical subject matter.

The USPTO’s struggle

between its 1996 Training Materials and its 2005 Interim Guidelines to reach a conclusion
regarding the patent eligibility of data signal claims suggests that distinguishing between
Beauregard-type stored software claims and data signal claims on the basis of functionality is
difficult, perhaps because neither type of claim directly affects the medium on which the
software is stored/transferred.
C. Evaluating Option 3: § 101 encompasses neither Beauregard-type stored software claims
nor data signal claims.
Given the lack of a decision on the merits by the Federal Circuit in In re Beauregard,
discussed in Part II.C., whether claims to software encoded on a memory storage device are
within the scope of § 101 remains unclear. Even though the USPTO dropped its rejections to
Beauregard’s claims in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Lowry, the differences
between the types of claims at issue in Lowry and Beauregard suggest that a decision adverse to
the USPTO in Beauregard was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. To the contrary, a closer
analysis of these two cases as well at the USPTO’s 1996 Guidelines, which provided a
framework for applying Lowry and other related cases to patentability issues, suggests that the
distinction between Lowry and Beauregard may also be the logical place to draw the line
between statutory and non-statutory subject matter under § 101.
In defining the permissible functional relationship between the descriptive material and
the computer readable medium either “as part of the stored data or as part of the computing
processes performed by the computer,” 89 as discussed in Part III.A., the 1996 Guidelines
embraced the types of claims at issue in both Lowry and Beauregard. Nonetheless, as embodied
in the quotation above, the 1996 Guidelines recognized some distinction between the two types
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of claims. Lowry’s data structures functionally affected the operation of the claimed memory
(through altering the organization of the information stored in the memory), while Beauregard’s
polygon-filling software functionally affected the operation of an unclaimed computer on which
the claimed memory would be run, rather than the functionality of the memory itself.
In other words, from the point of view of the memory-storage device, the effect of the
polygon-filling software from Beauregard on the operation of the memory when run by a
computer would be indistinguishable from the effect of any other software or data (including
non-functional descriptive material, such as a music file or a database file) stored on the
memory. In contrast, the presence of the data structures from Lowry on a memory storage device
would make that memory storage device more efficient in storing other, unrelated information
and would improve the overall computing efficiency. Thus, the functionality of the software in
relationship to its substrate in a Beauregard-type claim is quantifiably more attenuated than the
functionality in a Lowry-type claim.
V. Conclusion: Merits of the Direct Functional Relationship Inquiry for Assessment of
Patentability of Software-Related Inventions
Drawing the § 101 line for software-related claims between Lowry and Beauregard
would provide a number of advantages. First, requiring a direct functional relationship between
software and substrate would provide a much-needed jurisprudential handhold to break the
seemingly inevitable slide toward per se software claims, or at least toward the acceptance of
ever-more ephemeral articles of manufacture, to data signal claims and beyond. Also, this
distinction would appear to be in keeping with both the Federal Circuit’s decisions and with
technical distinctions and similarities among different types of software, given the emphasis of
both the courts and the USPTO on the practical application and function of software, at least to a
greater extent than any of the other options explored in Part IV. Third, by providing some
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stability to the application of § 101, the direct functional relationship standard outlined above
would provide predictability for patent applicants. Finally, a direct functional relationship would
provide a basis for further discussion regarding needed reforms to the proper scope and depth of
patent protection for software-related inventions, demarcating the patentable aspects of software
in contrast to those aspects that are more amenable to copyright protection.
Alternatively, the direct functional relationship between software and substrate could be
addressed through an inquiry under § 102 or § 103 rather than as a threshold § 101 issue as
advocated herein, particularly given that the Federal Circuit’s Lowry decision addressed § 102
and § 103 rejections, not a § 101 rejection. One commentator, though recognizing the technical
differences between the claims at issue in Lowry and those of Beauregard, concluded that claims
to software on a computer-readable medium such as those in Beauregard are statutory subject
matter, “simply because the storage of the computer instruction turns a computer readable
medium into a functional component which directly cooperates with the processor.” 90

The

computer-readable medium, however, may be a functional component which operates with the
processor even in the absence of software stored on the medium. The medium can operate as a
vessel onto which the processor can direct the storage of information, including software, and
thus a combination of software and storage medium should not qualify as § 101 subject matter
absent a direct functional relationship between the two. If the software or data structures
embedded on the computer-readable medium do not change the function of the medium itself,
then the software should instead be claimed in conjunction with a computer, whose function is
changed by the software. However, if courts were to conclude that Beauregard-type stored
software claims and possibly data signal claims were within the scope of § 101, the direct
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functional relationship inquiry could still be used to invalidate both types of claims under either
§ 102 or § 103. If certain software does not affect the function of a computer-readable medium
as such, the specific nature of that software is irrelevant to the function of the medium and
arguably does not create a “new” medium, thus possibly justifying rejection under § 102. A
stronger rejection would be available under § 103: if the precise nature of the software is
irrelevant to the function of the computer-readable medium as such, it would be obvious to
substitute one software program for another on the computer-readable medium.
However, functionality is also a question of utility, which is addressed under § 101. In §
101, “useful” modifies the four categories of patentable subject matter.

By requiring the

software component of a storage device, carrier wave, or other “manufacture” to be directly
functional with respect to the manufacture itself rather than only to an unclaimed computer or
other machine on which the software will ultimately operate, drawing the line between Lowry
and Beauregard to define statutory and non-statutory subject matter would respect the text and
construction of § 101 in a way that comports with the teachings of case law. This would also
avoid drawing legal distinctions between types of technologies (e.g. storage devices and carrier
waves) that perform nearly identical functions with respect to the distribution of computer
software. Ultimately, inquiring as to whether a direct relationship exists between software and
the computer-readable medium on which it is stored or transmitted, whether as part of the
analysis under § 101, § 102, or § 103, could serve as a basis for meaningfully separating
patentable from non-patentable stored software-related inventions.
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